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The Relation between Kin and Multi-level
Selection
An Approach Using Causal Graphs
Samir Okasha
Abstract
Kin selection and multi-level selection are alternative approaches for
studying the evolution of social behaviour, the relation between which
has long been a source of controversy. Many recent theorists regard
the two approaches as ultimately equivalent, on the grounds that gene
frequency change can be correctly expressed using either. However this
shows only that the two are predictively equivalent, not that they offer
equally good causal representations of the evolutionary process. This
paper articulates the notion of an ‘adequate causal representation’
using causal graphs, and then seeks to identify circumstances under
which kin and multi-level selection do and do not satisfy the test of
causal adequacy.
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1 Introduction
The evolution of social behaviour has been analyzed in two different
ways in the biology literature: the kin selection approach (KS) and
the multi-level selection approach (MLS). The former emphasizes the
genetic relatedness of social partners, while the latter emphasizes the
relative strengths of within and between-group selection. The relation
between the two approaches has been a source of controversy ever
since it was first broached by Hamilton ([1975]). In earlier debates
biologists tended to regard kin and multi-level (or group) selection
as alternatives to each other (for example, Maynard Smith [1976],
Dawkins [1982]). But many contemporary biologists maintain that
KS and MLS models of social evolution are actually equivalent, on the
grounds that gene frequency change can be correctly computed using
either; and some have proposed translation manuals for going from
one to the other.1 Though dissenters from this equivalence claim can
be found, the majority of social evolution theorists appear to subscribe
to it.2
In this paper I examine the relation between KS and MLS from a
new perspective. I grant (with one caveat) that the two are predic-
tively equivalent, in that the evolutionary change in a social trait (or
gene) can be correctly expressed by either (section 2). In this I follow
the current orthodoxy. However, I argue that this predictive equiva-
lence does not imply that the choice between the two approaches is
a matter of subjective taste, as is often assumed. For evolutionary
biology, like other sciences, aims to provide causal explanations; so
a description of evolutionary change should ideally yield an adequate
causal representation of the factors responsible for the change (section
3). My aim is to see whether this criterion can be used to discriminate
1The most explicit manual is found in Kerr and Godfrey-Smith ([2002]), who talk
about ‘individualist’ and ‘multi-level’ perspectives. Queller ([1992]) and Dugaktin and
Reeve ([1994]) also contain suggestions for relating KS to MLS. Lehmann et. al. ([2007])
provide a detailed account of how one particular model, originally formulated in MLS
terms, may be re-construed in KS terms, pace its authors; Grafen ([2007]) does likewise.
2Grafen ([1984]) was one of the first to explicitly defend the equivalence thesis; other
defenders include (Queller [1992]; Dugatkin and Reeve [1994]; Sober and Wilson [1998];
Kerr and Godfrey-Smith [2002]; Rousset [2004]; Lehmann et. al. [2007]; West, Griffin and
Gardner [2007], [2008]; McIlreath and Boyd [2007]; Foster [2009]; Frank [1998], [2013];
Marshall [2011]; West and Gardner [2013]). Dissenters from the equivalence thesis include
(van Veelen [2009]; Ho¨lldobler and Wilson [2009]; Traulsen [2010]; Nowak, Tarnita and
Wilson [2010]; Wilson [2012]).
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between the KS and MLS approaches to social evolution.
The notion of an ‘adequate causal representation’ obviously needs
unpacking. I start by illustrating the notion with a pair of examples in
which, intuitively, only one of KS or MLS counts as causally adequate
(section 4). An explicit account of what it means for a description of
evolutionary change to be ‘causally adequate’ is then developed, using
causal graphs (section 5). This enables us to identify cases in which
KS is preferable to MLS and cases in which the reverse is true. The
concluding discussion (section 6) traces the implications of the theory
developed here, relates the theory to extant work in the literature,
and speculates about empirical examples which might exemplify the
abstract causal relations depicted in the diagrams.
2 The KS and MLS Approaches
Determining the relation between KS and MLS is complicated by the
fact that neither has a canonical formulation that all parties agree on.
To circumvent this problem, I consider a simplified model of social
evolution that makes minimal assumptions, and use it to derive max-
imally general formulations of both KS and MLS, that permits their
explicit comparison.
Consider a population of haploid individuals living in groups of the
same size, within which social interactions occur (Figure 1). Genera-
tions are non-overlapping. An allele at a particular locus codes for a
social behaviour. We define pi = 1 if the i
th individual has the allele,
and pi = 0 otherwise; we refer to pi as the ‘p-value’ of individual i.
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Note that the index i ranges over all individuals in the global popula-
tion, irrespective of grouping. The population-wide frequency of the
allele is p, i.e. the average of all the individual p-values.
The reproductive output (‘fitness’) of individual i, defined as the
total number of successful gametes it contributes to the next gen-
eration, is denoted wi. The average fitness in the population is w.
Mutation is assumed absent. Under these assumptions, the change in
allele frequency over a single generation is given by:
∆p =
Cov(wi, pi)
w
(1)
3This terminology is adapted from Grafen ([1985]) who uses ‘p-score’ to denote the
frequency of an allele within an individual or linear combinations thereof.
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- pi = 0
- pi  = 1
Figure 1: Individuals in a group-structured population
as is well-known (Price [1970], Robertson [1966]).
Equation (1) tells us that the allele, and thus the social behaviour
that it codes for, will spread so long as Cov(wi, pi) > 0, i.e. there is
a positive covariance between an individual’s fitness and its p-value.
This is highly intuitive, formalizing the core neo-Darwinian idea that
genes associated with higher individual fitness will increase in fre-
quency.
Equation (1) is always true but not always useful, as it does not
discriminate between different reasons why an allele may covary pos-
itively with individual fitness. One possible reason is that the allele
directly enhances the fitness of its bearers; another is that the allele
causes its bearers to act in a way that enhances the fitness of oth-
ers, for example, by coding for an altruistic action towards relatives.
These two possibilities are quite different in terms of the phenotypes
they will give to rise to, but equation (1) holds true in either case.
Indicative of this is that although we specified that our allele codes
for a social behaviour, this fact plays no role in the derivation of (1).
To produce a more useful analysis of social evolution, the covari-
ance term in (1) can be decomposed into elements that are (hopefully)
more biologically meaningful. In effect, the KS and MLS approaches
constitute alternative ways of performing this decomposition. We con-
sider them in turn.
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2.1 The MLS decomposition
Since the individuals are nested in groups, the covariance term Cov(wi, pi)
can be written as the sum of ‘between-group’ and ’within-group’ com-
ponents, following Price ([1972]). We let pjk and wjk denote, respec-
tively, the p-value and fitness of the jth individual within the kth group;
we let Pk and Wk denote, respectively, the average p-value and aver-
age fitness of the individuals in the kth group (referred to henceforth
as ‘group p-value’ and ‘group fitness’.) It then follows that:
Cov(wi, pi) =
between-group︷ ︸︸ ︷
Cov(Wk, Pk) +
within-group︷ ︸︸ ︷
Ek[Cov(wjk, pjk)] (2)
The first RHS term of equation (2) is the covariance between group
p-value and group fitness; while the second RHS term is the average
across groups of the within-group covariance between individual p-
value and fitness. So the former measures the extent of ‘between-
group’ selection, while the latter measures the extent of ‘within-group’
selection. Substituting (2) into (1) then gives:
w∆p =
between-group︷ ︸︸ ︷
Cov(Wk, Pk) +
within-group︷ ︸︸ ︷
Ek[Cov(wjk, pjk)] (3)
Equation (3) is more useful than (1) for understanding social evo-
lution, and was employed by Price ([1972]) and Hamilton ([1975]) for
that purpose. To see why, suppose that the allele codes for an ‘altru-
istic’ behaviour which is individually costly but group-beneficial. In
that case, the first RHS term of equation (3) will be positive—groups
with a greater p-value will have higher group fitness—while the second
RHS term will be negative–within each group, individual p-value will
correlate negatively with fitness. Thus equation (3) captures the idea
that within-group and between-group selection may ‘pull’ in different
directions, an idea central to much theorizing in the MLS tradition.
It is easy to see why Hamilton ([1975]) described equation (3) as ef-
fecting a ‘formal separation of the levels of selection’ (p. 333), and
why modern advocates of MLS often use it as their central organizing
tool.4
4Works that accord a key role to equation (3) include (Queller [1992], Sober and Wilson
[1998], Michod [1999], Okasha [2006], McIlreath and Boyd [2007] and Bowles and Gintis
[2011]). Note that equation (3) describes multi-level selection of the MLS1 variety, in the
terminology of Damuth and Heisler ([1988]).
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From equation (3), it is straightforward to extract a condition for
the spread of the allele, namely Cov(Wk, Pk) > Ek[Cov(wjk, pjk)], i.e.
the between-group component of selection should exceed the within-
group. Where this inequality is satisfied, the allele will increase in
frequency in the next generation. More generally, equation (3) teaches
us that the direction of selection on a social trait depends crucially
on the balance between the within-group and between-group genetic
variance.
Finally, note that equation (3) rests on minimal assumptions. To
derive (3) from (1), we assumed only that the individuals in the popu-
lation were nested into non-overlapping groups of equal size.5 Nothing
was said about the nature of these groups, their persistence, mode of
reproduction, functional organization, nor the nature of inter-group
competition. Thus equation (3) is really an overarching model-schema
which captures the core MLS logic, and subsumes more specific mod-
els of evolution in structured populations. Let us refer to equation (3)
as the ‘MLS decomposition’ of the overall evolutionary change.
In taking equation (3) as a formalization of MLS, I am following
the orthodoxy among social evolutionists. However some authors, for
example, Goodnight, Schwartz and Stevens ([1992]), advocate the al-
ternative ‘contextual analysis’ approach to MLS, which partitions the
total change up differently. On that approach, the difference between
MLS and KS is considerably reduced, since contextual analysis and KS
are in fact very similar, conceptually and formally, as noted by Good-
night ([2013]). I do not discuss contextual analysis further here (see
Okasha [2006]), but simply assume, with the bulk of the recent social
evolution literature, that MLS is appropriately captured by equation
(3).
2.2 The KS decomposition
The key idea of the KS approach is that there are two distinct routes
by which an allele can increase its frequency in a population: en-
hancing the reproductive output of its bearer (the direct route), or
enhancing the reproductive output of other carriers of the allele (the
indirect route). The roots of this idea are present in Darwin ([1859])
and Haldane ([1932]), but it was Hamilton ([1964]) who first made it
5The equal size assumption is for convenience only. To deal with unequally sized groups,
we simply need to weight the covariance and expectation terms in equation (3) by group
size, as per Price ([1972]).
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explicit, with his concept of ‘inclusive fitness’ and his famous rb > c
rule for the spread of altruism.
The KS approach can be applied to our abstract model to yield
another decomposition of the total change, using a well-known tech-
nique.6 Since the allele codes for a social action, an individual’s fitness
wi depends on both its own p-value (pi), and on the average p-value
of its social partners (p′i), i.e. the other group members with whom it
interacts. We can thus write wi as a linear regression on pi and p
′
i:
wi = α+ βwp.p′pi + βwp′.pp
′
i + ei (4)
where α is ‘baseline’ fitness; βwp.p′ is the partial regression of individual
fitness on individual p-value, controlling for social partners’ p-value;
βwp′.p is the partial regression of individual fitness on social partners’
p-value, controlling for individual p-value, and ei is the residual. Note
that equation (4) does not presume that the true dependence of wi
on pi and p
′
i is linear; the regression equation can always be fitted,
thanks to the residual.
Equation (4) can then be substituted into equation (1), which after
simplification yields:
w∆p =
(
βwp.p′ + βwp′.pβp′p
)
V ar(p) (5)
where βp′p is the regression of social partners’ p-value on individual p-
value, and thus measures the genetic similarity among social partners.
To put equation (5) in more familiar form, we can then re-label
the βwp.p′ and βwp′.p coefficients as ‘–c’ and ‘b’ respectively, and the
βp′p coefficient as ‘r’, to give:
w∆p = (−c+ rb)V ar(p) (6)
Equation (6) yields Hamilton’s rule in its standard form, i.e. the
allele will spread so long as rb > c. It is important to see why the
re-labelling used to get from (5) to (6) is justifiable. Take the ‘r’ term
first. Though Hamilton originally defined ‘r’ in genealogical terms,
it is a familiar point that what really matters is the genetic similar-
ity of social interactants, not their genealogical relatedness; indeed
βp′p is nowadays a fairly standard definition of ‘r’ in the kin selection
literature.7
6This technique is used and discussed by (Queller [1992], [2011]; Frank [1998], Gardner,
West and Wild [2011]; Birch [forthcoming]), among others.
7For discussion of this point see (Hamilton [1975]; Grafen [1985]; Queller [1992], [2011];
Sober and Wilson [1998]; McIlreath and Boyd [2007]; Okasha [2008]; Birch [forthcoming]).
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Turning to ‘–c’, this refers to the cost, i.e. reduction in personal
fitness, incurred by an individual performing the social action. A
natural measure of this cost is the difference in personal fitness, on
average, between two individuals with the same social partners (i.e.
same value of p′i), one of whom has the allele (pi = 1), so performs the
social action, the other of whom does not (pi = 0); and this is exactly
how βwp.p′ is defined.
Turning to ‘b’, this is often defined as the benefit, i.e. increase in
personal fitness, that an individual performing a social action confers
on a recipient. Here we define ‘b’ slightly differently, as the average
benefit that an individual receives from its social partners, rather than
confers on them, which is what the βwp.p′ coefficient measures. This
means that equation (6) is a ‘neighbour-modulated’ rather than an
‘inclusive fitness’ version of KS theory.8
To facilitate explicit comparison with the MLS decomposition, it
helps to re-write (6) as:
w∆p =
direct effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
(−c)V ar(p) +
indirect effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
rbV ar(p) (7)
Equation (7) partitions the total change into ‘direct’ and ‘indi-
rect’ components, capturing the idea that the overall allele frequency
change depends on the direct effect of the allele on its bearers and on
the indirect effect on relatives. Let us refer to (7) as the ‘KS decom-
position’. Note that the KS decomposition deals only with individual
fitness—the expressions for group fitness (Wk) and group p-value (Pk)
do not feature in it; this is the key point of contrast with the MLS
decomposition.
The KS decomposition when derived this way is quite general, since
(7) follows from (1) with no new assumptions. Many models of kin
selection, including Hamilton’s original, make restrictive assumptions,
for example, that selection is weak, or that costs and benefits are
additive. However these assumptions are not needed to derive the
rb > c rule, if we are happy to define ‘r‘, ‘b’ and ‘c’ as above, as
Gardner, West and Wild ([2010]) stress.9
8For discussion of this distinction, see (Taylor and Frank [1996]; Rousset [2004]; Frank
[1998]; Wenseleers, Gardner and Foster [2010]; Taylor, Wild and Gardner [2007]; Birch
[unpublished]).
9Some critics, for example, Nowak, Tarnita and Wilson ([2011]), argue that defining
‘r‘, ‘b’ and ‘c’ as partial regression coefficients deprives them of biological meaning, as they
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3 Equivalence and Causality
The foregoing analysis helps explain why the MLS and KS approaches
are often regarded as equivalent. In any group-structured population,
the total evolutionary change can be decomposed using either equation
(3) or (7). Moreover, it is easy to see that the KS criterion for spread
of a pro-social trait (rb > c), will be satisfied if and only if the MLS
criterion (between-group > within-group) is satisfied. Thus the two
approaches are predictively equivalent. Gene frequency change can be
computed in two ways: by determining the magnitude of the between
and within-group components, or the direct and indirect effects; both
methods will always give the same answer.
In one respect the KS approach is more general. For in deriving
(7) we did not use the fact that the individuals are nested into non-
overlapping groups. All we assumed was that an individual’s fitness is
affected by its ‘social partners’. These social partners were stipulated
to be fellow group members, but this played no role in the deriva-
tion. It follows that the KS decomposition can apply to a population
where individuals interact with neighbours but there are no discrete
groups. However the MLS decomposition requires non-overlapping
groups. Though this difference is important, it has been discussed
elsewhere and is orthogonal to our main concerns here, so we leave it
aside.10
Granting the predictive equivalence of KS and MLS, it does not
follow that the choice between the two is a subjective or aesthetic
matter, as many authors imply. For the aim of evolutionary analysis
is not solely to predict changes in gene frequency, but also to provide
causal explanations of them (inter alia). So ideally we want a descrip-
tion of evolution to provide insight into the causal factors responsible
for the evolutionary change in question, in addition to computing the
correct answer.
The notion of causality rarely features explicitly in evolutionary
models; but it is usually assumed that at least some of the dependen-
cies between a model’s variables reflect causal relationships in nature.
For example if a population genetics model assigns different viabili-
become functions of population-wide gene frequencies. This is an important objection to
the ‘generalized’ version of Hamilton’s rule given in equation (7); however it raises issues
orthogonal to the ones treated in this paper.
10See (Maynard Smith [1976]; Okasha [2005], [2006]; Godfrey-Smith [2008]; Frank
[2013]) for discussion of this point.
9
ties to different genotypes, it is taken for granted that the viability
difference is meant to be caused by the genotypic difference (via some
phenotypic intermediary). This causal assumption does not feature
explicitly in the mathematics, but it is essential if the model is to be
of use in understanding real-world systems.
Turning to KS and MLS, are there circumstances in which one
provides a more adequate causal representation of social evolution
than the other? Someone might answer ‘no’ on the following grounds:
“suppose a gene for a social trait increases in frequency, i.e. ∆p > 0,
and we wish to explain why this is. One possible explanation is that
rb > c; another is that between-group selection exceeds within-group.
But these two inequalities hold in exactly the same circumstances,
therefore KS and MLS are explanatorily and not just predictively
equivalent.”
However this argument misses the point (though helps to clarify
the issue). For when we say that ∆p > 0 because the inequality
rb > c is satisfied (for example), this is not strictly speaking a causal
attribution. The satisfaction of the inequality does not literally cause
∆p to be non-zero, or to assume the particular value that it does.
So while it is true that the MLS and KS inequalities are satisfied in
exactly the same circumstances, it does not follow that the respec-
tive decompositions—equations (3) and (7)—constitute equally good
causal representations of the evolutionary process.
The idea of a description of evolutionary change being ‘causally
adequate’, or ‘true to the causal facts’, has often been appealed to
in the literature on levels of selection, but has never been made fully
precise.11 When the total evolutionary change is written using a statis-
tical partition, as above, a natural explication of this notion suggests
itself: the statistical associations between variables should reflect di-
rect causal influences in the world.12 This idea is spelled out in detail
in section 5, with the aid of causal graphs.
To fix ideas, and to connect with the literature, I turn first to two
‘problem cases’. In each, one of the two approaches (KS and MLS)
is causally adequate but the other is causally misleading, intuitively.
These cases will help illustrate the notion of causal adequacy.
11See in particular (Sober and Lewontin [1982]; Sober [1984]; Okasha [2006]; Godfrey-
Smith and Kerr [2013]; Frank [2013]; Birch [forthcoming]).
12This appears to correspond to what Okasha ([2006]), Frank ([2013]) and Birch ([forth-
coming]) refer to as a ‘causal decomposition’ of the total change, though none of these
works makes the notion precise.
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4 Two problem cases
4.1 The non-social trait case
The first case was introduced by Sober ([1984]) and Nunney ([1985]);
it is also discussed by (Heisler and Damuth [1987]; Okasha [2004a],
[2004b], [2006]; Godfrey-Smith and Kerr [2013]). Consider again a
group-structured population as in section 2. Suppose that the allele
in question codes for a non-social trait, for example, a physiological
property; so an individual’s fitness depends only on its own p-value,
not on the p-value of its fellow group members. Suppose also that most
of the genetic variance is between group, for whatever reason. Thus
the group p-values vary widely, but within any group the p-values of
individuals tend to be similar. Let us call this the ‘non-social trait’
case.
When the MLS decomposition (equation (3)) is applied to this
case, it yields the result that the between-group component of evolu-
tionary change Cov(Wk, Pk) is large, while the within-group compo-
nent Ek[Cov(wjk, pjk] is very small. So group-level selection is largely
responsible for the evolutionary change.
Intuitively this is an undesirable result. For it seems clear that the
trait for which the gene codes is an individual adaptation, that spreads
because it benefits individuals not groups. Groups in which the trait is
common have higher group fitness, but this is a side-effect of the fact
that individuals with the trait are fitter than individuals without (see
Okasha [2006]). Indicative of this is that the group structure makes
no difference to the evolutionary outcome; ∆p would be the same even
if the individuals didn’t live in groups. So while Cov(Wk, Pk) is large,
this does not reflect a direct causal influence of group p-value Pk on
group fitness Wk.
This point is related to G.C. Williams’ ([1966]) distinction between
‘group adaptation’ and ‘fortuitous group benefit’.13 Williams argued
that just because some feature of a group benefits the group doesn’t
mean that it evolved for that reason; it could be an incidental side-
effect of selection acting on individuals. But the MLS decomposition is
insensitive to Williams’ distinction; for it does not distinguish between
cases where Cov(Wk, Pk) reflects a direct causal influence of Pk on Wk
and cases where it is ‘caused from below’. In the latter, such as the
non-social trait case, the MLS decomposition is causally inadequate,
13Williams often uses the term ‘biotic adaptation’ in place of ‘group adaptation’.
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inviting the mistaken inference that the trait spreads because it is
group-beneficial.
Defenders of MLS have proposed two different solutions to this
problem. Sober ([2011]) argues that the MLS decomposition should
only be applied where ‘groups’ exist in some substantial sense. If
we define groups as entities within which fitness-affecting interac-
tions take place (with respect to the trait of interest), as per Sober
and Wilson ([1998]), then in the non-social trait case there are no
groups in the first place.14 A different approach is taken by Heisler
and Damuth ([1987]), Goodnight, Schwartz and Stevens ([1992]) and
Okasha ([2006]), who argue that the MLS decomposition should be re-
placed by ‘contextual analysis’ , which tries to isolate a genuine group
effect on individual fitness, thus distinguishing ‘real’ group selection
from cases of ‘causation from below’.
Here is not the place to discuss these proposed ‘fixes’ to the MLS
approach. But note that the KS approach deals neatly with the non-
social trait case.15 To see this, recall equation (7), which partitions
the total change into direct and indirect components. In the non-
social trait case the indirect component will be zero; this is because an
individual’s fitness depends only on its own p-value, so the b coefficient
in Hamilton’s rule will be zero. Thus the KS decomposition is causally
adequate in this example, correctly suggesting that the trait evolves
because it directly benefits the individuals that have it, not their social
partners or their groups.
4.2 Genotypic selection with meiotic drive
The second case is an example devised originally by Okasha ([2004a]),
and discussed in Okasha ([2006]) and Godfrey-Smith and Kerr ([2013]).
The example involves ‘frameshifting’ the multi-level apparatus down-
wards, by treating diploid organisms as groups of genes.16 Thus con-
sider a structured population in which the individuals are alleles and
14See Okasha ([2004a], [2011]) for discussion of this attempt to deal with the non-social
trait case.
15The KS approach is in fact closely related to contextual analysis. The only difference
is that in the linear regression model (4), in place of the p-value of the individual’s social
partners (p′i), contextual analysis uses as a regressor the p-value of the group to which the
individual belongs. See Okasha ([2004b]) and Goodnight ([2013]) for further discussion of
the relation between KS and contextual analysis.
16It is a familiar point that diploid population genetics can be regarded as a type of
multi-level selection by frameshifting in this way; for discussion of this point see (Wilson
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the groups are diploid genotypes, i.e. groups of size n=2. For simplic-
ity, consider a single locus with two alleles, A and B, and thus three
genotypes, AA, AB and BB. There are fitness differences between the
genotypes: wAA = 16, wAB = 12, wBB = 8. In addition, segregation
in the AB heterozygote is distorted in favour of A in the ratio 2:1, i.e.
of the 12 successful gametes that an AB organism produces, 8 contain
A and 4 contain B.17 The net evolutionary outcome depends on both
the genotypic fitness differences and the meiotic drive. Let us call this
the ‘genotypic-selection-with-drive’ case.
This case is naturally analysed using the MLS approach. The
fitness differences between genotypes constitutes between-group selec-
tion, while the meiotic drive constitutes within-group selection. Thus
we can define pi = 1 if the i
th allele is A, pi = 0 otherwise, and analyze
∆p using the MLS decomposition (equation (3)). Both of the right-
hand side terms will be non-zero, reflecting the fact that both within
and between-group selection are playing a role. Although in this ex-
ample the two levels of selection pull in the same direction—favouring
the A allele—the MLS framework still makes good sense here, since it
is clear that two distinct selective forces are at work.
The KS approach, by contrast, yields an untoward result, namely
that the direct effect is solely responsible for the evolutionary change,
i.e. the indirect effect in equation (7) is zero. For notice that the fit-
ness of an individual A allele is the same whether it is in an AA or an
AB organism; in either case it leaves 8 copies in the next generation.
So given the fitness scheme and the specific pattern of meiotic drive
posited, any allele’s fitness depends only on its own p-value, not on
the p-value of its social partner. Therefore the b coefficient in Hamil-
ton’s rule equals zero, so the indirect effect is zero. Formally this is
isomorphic to the non-social trait case, frameshifted down a level in
the biological hierarchy.
In this case the KS approach fails the test of causal adequacy,
as it invites the mistaken inference that the A allele spreads solely
because it is advantageous to the individual allele, and not because
it is advantageous to the group (i.e. host organism). Whereas in
reality, the spread of the A allele is partly due to the fact that an
organism’s fitness is causally influenced by the proportion of A alleles
it contains. (Were there no fitness differences between genotypes, the
([1997]; Okasha [2004c]; Gardner, West and Barton [2007]).
17The key feature of the example is that segregation in the heterozygote is distorted in
the ratio wAA : wBB .
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A allele would spread at a slower rate.)
The genotypic-selection-with-drive case shows that sometimes the
MLS approach is causally adequate while the KS approach is not.
There is also a more general moral, namely that isomorphism of fitness
structures does not necessarily imply isomorphism of the causal facts
giving rise to those fitness structures. It is striking that although
the genotypic-selection-with-drive and the non-social trait cases are
formally identical, given the particular parameter values chosen, the
MLS approach provides causal insight in the former but not the latter
case, and vice-versa for the KS approach.
To make progress, we need to clarify the notion of causal adequacy,
then to find a general account of when KS and MLS do and do not yield
causally adequate descriptions of evolution in structured populations.
5 Causal adequacy: a graphical approach
5.1 The basic idea
The basic idea to be defended is simple. A decomposition of evolu-
tionary change is causally adequate if and only if the statistical asso-
ciations that appear in the components reflect direct causal influences
between the variables in question.18 So for example, if there is a cor-
relation between group p-value Pk and group fitness Wk but no causal
influence of the former on the latter, as in the non-social trait case,
then the MLS decomposition is causally inadequate.
There are two ways in which a decomposition can fail to be causally
adequate: (i) it contains statistical associations between variables
which do not causally influence each other; or (ii) it contains statistical
associations between variables which only indirectly causally influence
each other. (The meaning of ‘indirect’ will become clear.) Intuitively
(i) is a more serious form of causal inadequacy than (ii). These ideas
are best illustrated by using causal graphs, or path diagrams.
We continue to use the structured population model of section 2.
Every individual i in the global population has a p-value pi, a fitness
wi, and an average social partners’ p-value p
′
i. For some purposes we
will need to explicitly model the (average) fitness of an individual’s
18It is taken as read here that one of the variables is fitness (of either individuals or
groups). Thus for equation (7) to be causally adequate, it is not required that the r term,
i.e. βp′p, should reflect a direct causal influence of p on p
′, obviously.
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social partners, which we denote by w′i. (Note that w
′
i does not occur
explicitly in either the MLS or KS decompositions.)
Suppose firstly that the gene codes for a social trait, so wi is
causally influenced by both pi and p
′
i, which are themselves corre-
lated. This is reflected in Figure 2, in which arrows denote causal
influences and dotted lines denote correlations. The strength of the
causal influences are measured by (unstandardized) path coefficients,
i.e. partial regressions, and of the correlations by simple covariances.
Note that wi and pi are connected by two distinct pathways, one direct
and the other indirect.
Figure 2 denotes a situation in which the KS decomposition is
causally adequate, since the ‘−c’ and ‘b’ terms of equation (7) reflect
direct causal influences between pi and wi, and p
′
i and wi, respectively.
The overall evolutionary change ∆p is given by Cov(wi, pi), as usual;
this covariance is the net result of the two distinct causal paths from
pi to wi, which correspond to the −c and b components of Hamilton’s
rule. Any case of social evolution involving causal dependencies as in
Figure 2 is naturally analyzed using the KS approach.
individual
character
      pi
individual
fitness
wi
bwp.p'
= -c
bwp.p'
= b
Cov (p, p')= r Var (p)
 partner
character
      p'i
w∆p = Cov(wi, pi) = (−c)V ar(p) + (rb)V ar(p)
Figure 2: Case where KS is causally adequate
The value of Cov(wi, pi) can be read directly off Figure 2 using the
rules of path analysis, yielding the KS decomposition (equation (7)).
These rules, first laid out by Sewall Wright, tell us how to compute the
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covariance between any two variables on an acyclic causal graph; the
basic idea is simply to find each distinct path from the dependent to
the independent variable, compute the product of the path coefficients
on each path, then sum over all the paths. In Figure 2, there are
two paths from wi to pi, one direct and one direct. The products
of the coefficients on each path are (−c) and (rb)V ar(p) respectively.
(However since the variables are unstandardized, the (−c) coefficient
on the direct path needs to be multiplied by V ar(p)).19 Summing
over the two paths, we can thus deduce the value of Cov(wi, pi), as in
equation (7).
5.2 Graphs with individual and group variables
Note that the key variables of the MLS decomposition, group p-value
Pk and group fitness Wk, do not appear in Figure 2. To facilitate
comparison between MLS and KS, we need to add these variables to
the causal graph. A change of notation is needed to do this. Instead
of Pk and Wk, which range over groups, we write Pi and Wi, which
range over individuals; these denote the average p-value and average
fitness of the group to which the ith individual belongs. So Pi and
Wi are in effect relational properties of individual i. Similarly, in
place of pjk and wjk, which denote the p-value and fitness of the j
th
individual in the kth group, we may write pji and wji, which denote
the p-value and fitness of the jth individual in the group to which
the ith individual belongs. This notational change does not affect the
MLS decomposition above, since Cov(Wk, Pk) = Cov(Wi, Pi), and
Ek[Cov(wjk, pjk)] = Ei[Cov(wji, pji)].
To depict individual and group variables on the same diagram,
we need to attend to the logical relations between them. This raises
some subtleties. Since a group’s p-value is defined as the average p-
value of its constituent individuals, and similarly for group fitness, the
following relationships must hold between Pi, pi and p
′
i, and between
Wi, wi and w
′
i:
Wi = (wi + (n− 1)w′i)/n (8)
Pi = (pi + (n− 1)p′i)/n (9)
where n is group size.
19See Heise ([1975]) for a good discussion of the path analysis rules for unstandardized
variables.
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Equations (8) and (9) express mathematical dependencies; any one
of the three variables {Pi, pi, p′i} is a linear function of the other two,
and similarly for {Wi, wi, w′i}. Despite this, in the case of equation
(9) at least, there is an intuitive asymmetry. It is individuals that
have p-values (genes) in the first instance, a group only has a p-value
(gene frequency) in virtue of the p-values of its constituent individu-
als; group p-value is a ‘mere aggregation’ of individual p-values. So
metaphysically, Pi is determined by pi and p
′
i, not vice-versa. It is
natural to depict this asymmetry graphically by drawing arrows from
pi and p
′
i to Pi, as in Figure 3 below.
individual
character
      pi
Group 
character
Pi
 partner
character
      p'i
Pi = (pi + (n− 1)p′i)/n
Figure 3: Relation between individual, partner
and group characters
It might be objected that the dependencies depicted in Figure 3
are not really causal. Strictly speaking surely Pi supervenes on, or
is metaphysically determined by, pi and p
′
i, rather than being caused
by them? Arguably this is true (though some authors, for example,
Searle ([1992]), hold that a supervenience relationship can itself be
causal). However the real issue is whether a relation of metaphysical
dependence can be depicted as if it were causal without violating the
principles of causal modelling. I think the answer is ‘yes’, though there
is one complication.20
20This question does not seem to have raised in the causal modelling literature, though
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In the causal modelling literature, the meaning of the arrows is
usually explained in terms of hypothetical interventions (for example,
Pearl ([2000])). An arrow between X and Y means that if one were
to ‘intervene on’, i.e. experimentally manipulate, variable X, while
keeping everything else fixed, then Y would change too. The arrows
in Figure 3 do satisfy this interpretation. Intervening on either pi or
p′i while keeping the other fixed will necessarily change the value of
Pi. In this respect, the relations between pi and Pi and p
′
i and Pi are
akin to causal relations, even if strictly speaking they are relations of
metaphysical determination.
The complication comes when we consider intervening on Pi itself,
i.e. changing the group p-value. For it is impossible to change Pi while
holding pi and p
′
i fixed, given the supervenience of the former on the
latter.21 One might argue that for this very reason, it is impossible
for variables such as Pi to have causal effects of their own, and thus
that in any causal graph containing the variables Pi, pi and p
′
i, no
causal arrows should come out of Pi. However this is a controversial
metaphysical issue which it is better not to pre-judge, so the following
convention is adopted here.22 In a causal graph in which one variable
supervenes on others, when we consider hypothetically intervening on
the supevenient variable we do not hold fixed the variables on which
it supervenes, but rather alter them to preserve consistency. Modulo
this convention, causal arrows going out of supervenient variables, if
any, can be understood in the usual way.
What about the relation between Wi, wi and w
′
i? In some cases it
will parallel the relation between Pi, pi and p
′
i; but this need not be
so, for fitness is a different sort of property to p-value. If the group
is a mere collection of individuals each of which is able to survive
and reproduce independently, then intuitively fitness is a property of
individuals in the first instance, and group fitness Wi is derivative. In
such cases then Wi is metaphysically determined by wi and w
′
i, just
as for Pi, pi and p
′
i. However in other cases it is the whole group that
has a fitness in the first instance, which is then shared out among the
individuals in the group by an allocation mechanism; see below. In
such cases an arrow runs from Wi to wi (and to w
′
i), rather than vice-
see Shipley ([2000], pp.43-5) on how to deal with ‘conserved quantities’ in a causal model.
21This is related to what are called ‘fat hand’ interventions in the causal modelling
literature; see Scheines ([2006]).
22The issue here is closely connected to the discussion of ‘causal exclusion’ in the phi-
losophy of mind; see Kim ([1998]).
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versa, i.e. the fitness of any individual is determined by the fitness of
its group and the allocation mechanism. These two possibilities are
depicted in Figure 4. Note that equation (8) holds true in both cases.
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Group 
fitness
Wi
 partner
 fitness
     w'i
Group 
fitness
Wi
individual
  fitness
      wi
 partner
  fitness
     w'i
 allocation 
mechanism
4a 4b
Wi = (wi + (n− 1)w′i)/n
Figure 4: Relation between individual, partner
and group fitness
To better understand Figure 4b, consider an example. Suppose a
group is engaged in cooperative hunting, and gets a particular quan-
tity of meat on a given day—the ‘group payoff’—which is shared out
among the individuals in the group (fairly or otherwise). We can
think of the group and individual payoffs as proxies for group and
individual fitness. There is a mathematical relation between the indi-
vidual payoffs and the group payoff: the former add up to the latter.
But intuitively, it is the group payoff plus the allocation rule that de-
termines the individual payoffs, not vice-versa. The explanation of
why any individual received the particular payoff they did, is that the
whole group received a particular payoff, a certain portion of which
was allocated to that individual. Conversely, the explanation of why
the group received the payoff it did is not that each of the individuals
received the payoff that they did. So the group payoff is primary and
the individual payoffs are derivative. Similarly, in certain cases group
fitness will be primary and individual fitness derivative, as in figure
4b.
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Where Figure 4b applies, and in the co-operative hunting example
above, it may be difficult to decide whether the arrow from Wi to wi
should be interpreted as causation or metaphysical determination. Is
an individual’s fitness caused by its group’s fitness (along with the
allocation mechanism), or does it supervene on it? Fortunately we do
not need to resolve this issue, as nothing of substance depends on it.
What is important is the contrast between Figures 4a and 4b.
To summarize, it is possible to incorporate variables that are math-
ematically related, such as individual and group variables, on a causal
graph. Firstly we need to determine the direction of metaphysical
determination between the variables. (This may involve modal intu-
itions, empirical knowledge of the system being modeled, or both).
We then draw arrows that reflect this metaphysical determination,
which can be interpreted in the usual way. Secondly, we adoption the
convention that when intervening on a supervenient variable, we do
not hold fixed the variables on which it supervenes, but rather adjust
them to preserve consistency.
5.3 Cases where KS is causally adequate
Now consider the non-social trait case, in which an individual’s fitness
depends only on its own p-value, with no contribution from social
partners. This is depicted in Figure 5, where the only arrow going in
to wi is from pi. Similarly, the fitness of individual i’s social partners,
w′i, depends only on p
′
i. In this case the group fitness Wi is determined
by wi and w
′
i, just as in Figure 4a: what leads a group to have the
fitness value it does is precisely that its constituent individuals have
the fitness values that they do. Hence the arrows from wi and w
′
i to
Wi.
Note that in Figure 5, group p-value Pi correlates with but does
not causally influence group fitness Wi. The reason for the correlation
is clear: these two variables are joint effects of a common cause (pi). If
we increase the pi value of individual i, this will increase Pi; it will also
increase wi and thus Wi. By contrast, changing p
′
i has no effect on wi,
indicating the absence of social partners’ contribution to individual
fitness. The absence of a causal arrow between Pi and Wi means that
the MLS decomposition is causally inadequate: the term Cov(Wi, Pi)
does not reflect a causal influence. By contrast, the KS decomposition
is causally adequate.
Suppose we modify Figure 5 by adding causal arrows from p′i to wi
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Figure 5: Non-social trait case
and from pi to w
′
i, yielding Figure 6. Thus we no longer have a non-
social trait, since an individual’s fitness is now causally influenced
by social partners. However in Figure 6 the MLS approach is still
causally inadequate. For there is still no causal arrow between group
p-value Pi and group fitness Wi—they are joint effects of a common
cause. So the Cov(Wi, Pi) term of equation (3) still does not reflect a
causal influence of Pi on Wi. Conversely, the KS approach is causally
adequate—for both the b and c terms of equation (7) reflect direct
causal influences, as the figure shows. This shows that the presence
of fitness-affecting interactions between social partners is not suffi-
cient for the MLS approach to be causally adequate; the group-level
covariance may still be a non-causal side effect.
What biological cases does Figure 6 apply to? The key features are
the presence of social interactions between individuals within groups,
but the absence of a causal influence of group p-value Pi on either
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individual or group fitness. This means that the causal explanation
of any individual’s fitness can be given in terms that refer only to
individual-level properties, i.e. pi and p
′
i. This will be true if there is no
group-level functional organization, and the groups exhibit no emer-
gent properties of their own, i.e. the only group properties are aggre-
gations of individual properties, such as Pi. Many mammalian social
groups, for example, buffalo herds and baboon troops, arguably sat-
isfy these conditions. Extensive social interactions take place within
such groups, but the groups are not functionally integrated in the way
that eusocial insect colonies are, for example.
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Figure 6: Social trait case where KS is
causally adequate, MLS not
Suppose instead that we modify Figure 5 by adding a causal arrow
from Pi to both wi and w
′
i, yielding Figure 7. In this causal scheme,
each individual’s fitness is causally influenced by its own p-value and
also by the p-value of the group to which it belongs, and thus only
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indirectly by social partners’ p-value. This causal scheme will apply if
a group’s p-value gives rise to further group-level ‘emergent properties’
(not modeled here), which in turn affect individual fitness. If so, then
the causal explanation of any individual’s fitness will involve group
as well as individual properties, unlike in Figure 6. However, group
fitness is still derivative: a group only has a fitness value in virtue of
the fitnesses of its constituent individuals.
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Figure 7: Social trait case where neither
KS nor MLS is causally adequate
Figure 7 represents an interesting case, in that neither KS nor
MLS is causally adequate. KS is inadequate for the second of the two
reasons mentioned above: although pi and p
′
i do causally influence
wi, the latter does so only indirectly, via its effect on group p-value
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Pi. So the b and c terms of the KS decomposition do not reflect di-
rect causal influences. Similarly, MLS is inadequate because although
group p-value Pi does influence group fitness Wi, it does so indirectly,
via its effect on wi and w
′
i. So the Cov(Wi, Pi) term of the MLS de-
composition does not reflect a direct causal influence. The criterion
of causal adequacy offers no basis for preferring one approach to the
other in this case, though note that in both cases the inadequacy is of
the second, less serious sort.23
5.4 Cases where MLS is causally adequate
To depict a case where MLS is causally adequate, let us frameshift
downwards again as in section 4.2; so the ‘individuals’ are alleles and
the ‘groups’ are diploid organisms of size n=2. As before we consider
a single locus with two alleles A and B, and thus three genotypes AA,
AB and BB. We define pi=1 if the i
th allele is an A, 0 otherwise;
so p is the population-wide frequency of the A allele. Assume firstly
that meiosis is fair, i.e. within-group selection is absent; but there
are fitness differences between genotypes. This scenario, which I call
‘Genotypic selection with fair meiosis’ is depicted in Figure 8 below.
Note that in Figure 8, a causal arrow leads from group fitness Wi
to individual fitness wi (as in Figure 4b above). This is because it
is a group (i.e. diploid organism) that has a fitness value in the first
instance, i.e. it contributes a certain number of successful gametes to
the next generation, depending on its genotype. This gametic output
is shared equally among group members (i.e. the two alleles), owing
to the fairness of meiosis, so the fitness of an individual allele (wi) is
simply equal to the fitness of its group (Wi), which is itself causally
determined by the group’s p-value (Pi), which in turn is determined
by individual p-value (pi) and partner p-value (p
′
i).
There are two key features of Figure 8. Firstly, group fitness Wi
is primary and individual fitness wi derivative. The fitness of any
individual (i.e allele) is determined by the fitness, or total gametic
output, of the group (i.e. diploid organism) to which it belongs. So
an arrow runs from Wi to wi, not vice-versa.
24 Secondly, group fitness
23Arguably, a causally adequate decomposition of ∆p in Figure 7 would be provided by
‘contextual analysis’, which constitutes a kind of hybrid of the KS and MLS approaches;
see footnote 15 above.
24An arrow also runs from Wi to partner fitness w
′
i in this example, but the variable w
′
i
is omitted from the graph for simplicity.
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Figure 8: Genotypic selection with fair meiosis
Wi is caused by group p-value (Pi), and thus only indirectly by pi
and p′i. The reason for this is clear. The full causal explanation of
why an organism has a particular fitness value (Wi) would refer to its
phenotype, which depends in a complex way on its genotype (Pi), both
of which are whole-organism properties. These is no reason to hold
that properties of alleles, i.e. p and pi, are doing the ‘real’ causal work,
nor therefore that the link between Pi and Wi is a mere non-causal
correlation.
Figure 8 depicts a situation in which MLS is causally adequate.
Within-group selection is absent, so the overall evolutionary change
∆p is proportional to Cov(Wi, Pi), i.e. the covariance between group
p-value and group fitness, which is by definition equal to bWP .V ar(Pi).
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Since there is a direct causal influence of Pi on Wi, the strength of
which is measured by bWP , it follows that the MLS decomposition is
causally adequate.
By contrast, the KS decomposition is inadequate as applied to
Figure 8. For again, the causal influences of pi on wi, and of p
′
i on
wi, are both indirect, mediated by group fitness Wi. To see this, pick
an individual with pi=0, i.e. a B allele, and consider hypothetically
altering its p-value to pi=1, i.e. mutating it into an A. This will alter
the genotype of the allele’s host organism, i.e. Pi will increase by
1/2, which in turn will alter the organism’s fitness Wi, thus indirectly
affecting the individual allele’s own fitness wi. Similarly, altering p
′
i
affects wi only indirectly, via affecting Wi. Thus the KS decomposition
is causally inadequate; for the b and c components of equation (7)
reflect highly indirect causal influences.
To appreciate this point from another angle, contrast Figures 6
and 8. In both cases, pi and p
′
i are the ultimate causal determinants
of individual fitness wi; and the KS decomposition can be applied to
both, if desired. However in Figure 6, pi and p
′
i directly cause wi,
while in Figure 8 the causation is indirect, mediated by group p-value
Pi and group fitness Wi. So Figure 6 depicts a case where KS is
causally adequate but MLS is not; while Figure 8 depicts a case where
MLS is causally adequate but KS is not.
The contrast between Figures 6 and 8 highlights that whether a
causal influence between variables counts as direct or indirect depends
on which other variables we are considering. In describing the influ-
ence of pi on wi in Figure 6 as ‘direct’, this does not mean that there
are no causal intermediaries at all between pi and wi, but just that
none of the other variables in our model (for example, Pi or Wi) is
such an intermediary. Thus the notion of directness is model-relative.
This is a corollary of a point stressed in the causal modeling literature,
namely that a choice must always be made about which variables to
include in a causal graph and which to omit (see Pearl [2000]; Spirtes,
Glymour and Scheines [2001]).
It is interesting to consider whether the causal structure depicted in
Figure 8 might apply to any cases in which the ‘individuals’ are whole
organisms and the ‘groups’ are social groups. The crucial feature of
Figure 8 is that an arrow leads from group fitness Wi to individual
fitness wi, rather than the other way around, and that this is the sole
determinant of wi. This means that the group as a whole attains a
given fitness value, depending on its group properties; and any indi-
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vidual’s fitness value is a causal consequence of its group having the
fitness value that it does. Plausibly, this might apply to certain co-
operatively breeding groups, or eusocial insect colonies, in which any
individual’s reproductive success is heavily dependent on the group,
and some mechanism exists for suppressing reproductive competition
within the group. We return to this issue in the next section.
Lastly, consider the second ‘problem case’ from section 4.2: genotypic-
selection-with-drive. Suppose that the A allele is a meiotic driver.
This case is depicted in Figure 9, which differs from Figure 8 in that
an individual allele’s fitness wi now depends not just on group fitness
Wi, but also on the share of the group’s fitness that accrues to it,
i.e. the ‘allocation mechanism’. Since meiosis is not fair, this share
is not constant for all i. The share of group fitness that accrues to
individual i is jointly determined by pi and p
′
i. (This share may be
measured by the deviation of an individual’s fitness from the mean
fitness of its group.) If pi = p
′
i, i.e. if the individual is in an AA
or BB homozygote, then the group fitness is shared equally; while if
pi 6= p′i, i.e. the individual is in an AB heterozygote, then the group
fitness is unequally shared, due to meiotic drive.
The causal structure in Figure 9 highlights the two different routes
by which an individual allele can increase its fitness : (i) by increas-
ing the total fitness of its group, or (ii) by increasing its share of the
group’s fitness. (If fair meiosis is in place then route (ii) is closed
off, and we are back to Figure 8). These two causal pathways corre-
spond to the between-group and within-group components of the MLS
decomposition.
Figure 9 depicts a situation where MLS is causally adequate, in
that Pi directly causes Wi, so the between-group component of the
MLS decomposition, Cov(Wi, Pi), reflects a direct causal influence.
Unlike in Figure 8, there is also a component of within-group selection,
i.e. meiotic drive; so the total change ∆p is given by the sum of the
within-group and between-group components, as in equation (3). This
means that the second causal pathway from pi to wi, that goes via the
variable ‘share of group fitness to individual i’, corresponds to the
within-group term of the MLS decomposition.25
Note that in Figure 9, two causal pathways run from partner p-
value p′i to individual fitness wi. To understand this, consider an
25Note that this within-group term, i.e. Ek[Cov(wjk, pjk)](or equivalently Ei[Cov(wji, pji)]),
though corresponding to a specific causal pathway on Figure 9, cannot be directly read
off the figure, since the wji and pji variables do not explicitly feature in Figure 9.
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Figure 9: Genotypic selection with meiotic drive
individual A allele in an AA homozygote. This individual has pi=1,
p′i=1 and Pi=1. Consider intervening to set p
′
i=0, i.e. mutating the
partner into a B. This intevention has two effects: it converts the
host organism into an AB heterozygote, i.e. makes Pi =
1
2 , thus
altering the group fitness Wi; and it also increases the share of the
group fitness that accrues to individual i. In section 4.2, the chosen
parameter values ensured that these two effects exactly cancel. (These
values were: wAA = 16, wAB = 12, wBB = 8, with segregation in AB
distorted 2:1 in favour of A.) With these parameter values, reducing
p′i from 1 to 0 decreases group fitness by 4, but increases individual i’s
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share of the group fitness by 4. So it appears that individual fitness
wi is causally uninfluenced by partner p-value p
′
i. However, this is an
illusion: p′i and wi are connected by two causal pathways, and the
causal influences transmitted along the two pathways exactly cancel
out. Thus wi appears to depend only on pi.
We can now see clearly the difference between the non-social trait
case (Figure 5), and the genotypic-selection-with-drive case (Figure
9). In the former, wi is caused solely by pi, as there is no causal path
from p′i to wi. So altering p
′
i has no effect on wi. In the latter, there
are two causal paths from p′i to wi; but altering p
′
i has no net effect
on wi because, given the particular parameter values chosen, the two
causal influences exactly cancel out. So the fitness values in the two
cases are isomorphic, but the causal structures that give rise to them
are quite different. This in turn explains why the KS approach is
causally adequate in the non-social trait case but the MLS approach
is not; and vice-versa in the genotypic-selection-with-drive case.
Interestingly, the circumstance where a causal influence along one
path exactly cancels that along another is well-known in the liter-
ature on causal modeling. Pearl ([2000]) refers to this as ‘instabil-
ity’, while Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines ([2001]) call it ‘unfaithful-
ness’. This phenomenon complicates the task of inferring causality
from correlational data, for it implies that the joint probability dis-
tribution on a set of observed variables will be a misleading guide
to the underlying causal structure. This is precisely what we see in
the genotypic-selection-with-drive case, and is precisely why the KS
approach as applied to this case is misleading. The above authors
emphasize, however, that instability / unfaithfulness is likely to be a
rare circumstance in practice, as it only arises for specific parameter
values. This point also applies in the genotypic-selection-with-drive
case, as the canceling effect only occurs given the specific combination
of genotype fitness values and meiotic drive posited.
Again, it is interesting to consider whether Figure 9 might apply to
organisms in social groups, rather than genes in genomes. The crucial
features are that group fitness determines individual fitness, but the
group’s fitness is unequally divided; so individuals can enhance their
fitness either by boosting group fitness, or by boosting their share of
it. Conceivably this could apply to social groups with co-operative
breeding and/or reproductive division of labour, where individuals
can only reproduce as part of their group, but in which reproductive
competition among group members is not fully suppressed. In such
29
scenarios, the MLS approach is likely to be causally adequate.
6 Discussion
The foregoing analysis has a number of implications for the debate
between KS and MLS. Firstly, the widespread view that the choice
between the two approaches is a matter of modelling preference, or
computational convenience, is untenable. The predictive equivalence
of KS and MLS does not imply that they constitute equally adequate
causal representations of evolutionary change. Secondly, claims for
the global superiority of one of the two approaches are untenable.26
Given our analysis of causal adequacy, it seems likely that empirical
cases exist where only one of the two approaches counts as causally
adequate.
It is interesting to note that in cases where the KS approach fails
the test of causal adequacy (Sigures 7, 8 and 9), this is always for
the second, less serious reason, i.e. the b and c terms of equation (7)
reflect indirect causal influences. By contrast in some cases, the MLS
approach fails to be causally adequate for the more serious reason,
namely the ‘between-group’ term of equation (3) reflects a correlation
between variables that do not causally influence each other at all, but
are joint effects of a common cause (Figures 5 and 6). This difference
relates to the fact that in all the causal graphs above, pi and p
′
i are
the ultimate causes of individual fitness wi, thus the KS decomposition
can only fail to be adequate because pi and p
′
i cause w indirectly.
This consideration highlights the fact that the KS approach is re-
ductionistic, or individualistic. Such an approach must always be
possible, since the evolutionary change of interest, ∆p, is the change
in the population mean of an individual property pi.
27 ∆p is given by
the global covariance between pi and fitness wi, as equation (1) tells
us, which is the net result of two causal paths: from pi to wi, and from
p′i to wi. So the overall evolutionary change is always ‘ultimately’ at-
tributable to these two causal paths. However it does not follow that
the KS approach is always superior. Where the causal paths from pi
26Such claims have been made for KS by West, Griffin and Gardner ([2008]), Bourke
([2011]) and others; and for MLS by Sober and Wilson ([1998]), Nowak, Tarnita and
Wilson ([2010]) and others.
27This reflects the fact that the type of multi-level selection in question is MLS1 rather
than MLS2, in the terminology of Heisler and Damuth ([1987]).
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and p′i to wi are mediated by group p-value and group fitness, as in
Figures 8 and 9, the MLS approach offers more insight. This is an in-
stance of the general moral that reductionistic explanations in science
are not always superior.
Our analysis identifies one issue, in particular, as critical to the
choice between KS and MLS: whether an arrow leads from individual
fitness wi to group fitness Wi, or vice-versa. In the non-social trait
case, and arguably in some social trait cases, the arrow runs from
wi to Wi. In such cases, fitness and reproduction are properties of
individuals, and a group only has a fitness value as a consequence of
its constituent individuals having their fitness values. In other cases,
including the ‘genes in genomes’ cases depicted in Figures 8 and 9 and
arguably in certain ‘organisms in groups’ cases too, fitness pertains to
the whole group in the first instance, and any individual has a fitness
value only as a consequence of its group having a fitness value.
The distinction between wi determining Wi, and the converse, is
clear at the abstract level of causal graphs; but it is not easy to say
what biological features determine which side a given case falls on.
One relevant feature is whether individuals are capable of surviving
and reproducing independently of their group. If they are, then it is
natural to regard a group’s fitness as an aggregation of the individ-
uals’ fitnesses, even if there are extensive social interactions, so the
arrow runs from wi to Wi. But if they are not, then the group is the
‘primary’ bearer of fitness, and individual fitness is derivative. By the
same token, if there is extensive reproductive division-of-labour within
a group, with some individuals specialized in somatic and others in
reproductive tasks, as in some eusocial insect colonies, then the group
is naturally treated as the primary bearer of fitness. This conceptu-
alization is standard among at least some social insect biologists (for
example, Seeley [1997]; Ho¨lldobler and Wilson [2009]).
Where group fitness is primary, then an allocation mechanism must
determine the share of the group’s fitness that each individual re-
ceives. One possibility is that a mechanism exists that suppresses
within-group competition; if the mechanism works perfectly then all
individuals in the group receive equal shares, so Wi = wi for all i, as in
Figure 8. Numerous such mechanisms exist in nature (Frank [2003]).
Fair meiosis is one such example; others include policing of worker
reproduction in social insects (Ratnieks and Reeve [1992]), enforced
monogamy in human groups (Alexander [1987]), punishment of selfish
actions in human groups (Bowles and Gintis [2011]), and restricting
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cell-lineages’ access to the germ-line in multicellular organisms (Buss
[1987]). These mechanisms all tend to suppress the variation in indi-
vidual fitness within groups.
In cases where group fitness is primary and the suppression mech-
anism works near-perfectly, it is common to treat the whole group as
the adapted unit rather than as an aggregation of lower-level units.
Biologists think like this when they treat a multi-celled organism as
an adapted unit rather than a mere aggregation of cell-lineages, a
eukaryotic cell as an adapted unit rather than a mere aggregation
of prokaryotic units, and a diploid genome as an adapted unit rather
than a mere aggregation of alleles. The theory presented here supports
this conceptualization, since in such cases (depicted in Figure 8), the
MLS approach comes out as causally adequate, and the entirety of the
evolutionary change is attributable to between-group selection. But
even if the suppression mechanism is not perfect, the MLS approach
may still be causally adequate as long as an arrow runs from Wi to wi,
as in Figure 9; there is then a component of within-group selection.
The important contrast is with cases where individual fitness is pri-
mary, i.e. an arrow runs from wi to Wi, in which the MLS approach
is causally inadequate.
In certain empirical cases, it may be indeterminate which causal
graph fits the case best, and thus indeterminate whether IF or MLS
is causally adequate. Possible examples include cellular slime molds,
social bacteria colonies, certain Volvox colonies, and certain marine in-
vertebrate colonies; in these cases, it is unclear whether Wi metaphys-
ically determines wi or vice-versa. But this is not a problem; indeed
some such indeterminacy is only to be expected, given the literature
on evolutionary transitions.28 This literature teaches us that social
interaction among free-living individuals living in groups, for exam-
ple, cells in cell-groups, was likely a precursor stage in the evolution of
new higher-level biological units, for example, multi-celled organisms,
in which the original individuals have lost the ability to survive and
reproduce independently and are mere parts of the whole. The theory
presented here implies that in the early transitional stages, only KS
would have been causally adequate, as group fitness would have been
derivative from individual fitness, while in the latter stages, only MLS
would have been causally adequate. Since evolutionary transitions are
inevitably gradual, a zone of indeterminacy is thus to be expected.
28See in particular (Buss [1987]; Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry [1995]; Michod [1999];
Queller [1997]; Godfrey-Smith [2009]; Bourke [2011]; Calcott and Sterelny [2011].)
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6.1 Relation to Previous Work
It is worth relating the theory presented above to previous work. In
recent incarnations of the ‘KS versus MLS’ debate in the biology lit-
erature, a number of authors have argued in favour of one approach
and against the other. These arguments are of two main sorts. Their
protagonists either reject the predictive equivalence of KS and MLS,
or else accept that equivalence but advance ‘pragmatic’ considerations
in favour of one of them. The former is an option because to prove
the predictive equivalence of KS and MLS, the ‘r’, ‘b’ and ‘c’ terms
must be defined in a particular way; theorists such as Nowak, Tar-
nita and Wilson ([2011]) regard these definitions as lacking biological
meaning, and thus dispute the claim that KS covers all cases of social
evolution. The latter is an option because predictively equivalent de-
scriptions may differ in respect of computational tractability, or ease
of empirical application; it is on this basis that authors such as West,
Griffin and Gardner ([2007], [2008]) and Frank ([2013]) favour KS over
MLS, for example.
The theory presented here also seeks to discriminate between KS
and MLS, but in a different way. My approach has been to grant,
at least for the sake of argument, the assumptions necessary to es-
tablish the predictive equivalence of KS and MLS, but to emphasize
another dimension—causal adequacy—on which to compare the two
approaches. Unlike pragmatic factors, which are partly subjective,
the question of whether a given description of evolutionary change is
causally adequate is fully objective, so long as it is clear which causal
graph is applicable.
Our theory prompts comparison with recent work by Godfrey-
Smith and Kerr ([2013]), who contrast ‘contextual’ and ’collective’
ways of modeling evolution in structured populations, building on
their earlier work. (This contrast corresponds closely to the KS ver-
sus MLS distinction.) They lay out an abstract theory for choosing
between these two modelling approaches, and test it against a vari-
ety of problem cases (including the ‘non-social trait’ and ‘genotypic-
selection-with-drive’ cases of section 4.2 above.) Godfrey-Smith and
Kerr mention ‘causal adequacy’, but do not explicitly depict the hy-
pothesized causal relations between the state-variables of their evolv-
ing system. Instead they devise a criterion, the ‘near-variant’ test, for
deciding whether a given case should be modeled in ‘contextual’ or
‘collective’ terms (given that both options are always available). In
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effect, the near-variant test involves modifying the fitness structure
slightly, then seeing whether the modification is more simply accom-
modated by the contextual or collective approach, by asking how many
parameters must be changed in each case.
The ‘near-variant test’ is interesting, and delivers intuitively plau-
sible answers. However the test has a rather pragmatic flavour, so it
is unclear whether it can be more than a heuristic guide to the true
causal structure of the evolutionary process. The approach taken here
is different, in that the hypothesized causal relations between vari-
ables are explicitly represented on a graph, and an explicit criterion
of causal adequacy is proposed; it is then possible to specify exactly
what the true causal graph must be like, in order for a candidate sta-
tistical partition of the evolutionary change to be causally adequate.
Logically this is a quite different procedure to that of Godfrey-Smith
and Kerr, so it is striking that their test and our theory yield similar
verdicts in at least some cases. Further work on the relation between
our theory and the near-variant test might be useful.
Recent work by Gardner and Grafen ([2009]) studies the con-
ditions under which groups may be considered ‘adapted units’, us-
ing Grafen’s ‘formal Darwinism’ framework. They argue that clonal
groups, and groups in which within-group reproductive competition is
completely suppressed, are the only situations in which group adapta-
tionism is valid. (Okasha and Paternotte ([2013]) re-visited Gardner
and Grafen’s analysis and found that the argument only holds in the
repression-of-competition case.) Though these papers are about group
adaptation rather than group (or multi-level) selection, which is the
focus here, it is natural to expect a connection; and there is one. For
complete suppression of within-group competition corresponds to Fig-
ure 8 above; in this case the MLS approach is causally adequate and
within-group selection is null. (By contrast, if groups are clonal this
does not imply the causal adequacy of MLS, since it is possible that we
are dealing with a non-social trait case, as in Figure 5.) Thus the cir-
cumstances under which ‘group adaptationism’ is valid, according to
Gardner and Grafen’s analysis as amended by Okasha and Paternotte,
are precisely those in which the MLS approach is causally adequate
and within-group selection is null, according to the theory presented
here.
Lastly, Michod and collaborators have outlined a theoretical frame-
work for studying ‘evolutionary transitions in individuality’ and ap-
plied it to the evolution of multi-cellularity, using V olvox as a model
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system.29 A key idea in their framework is that during a transition,
the fitness of a group eventually becomes ‘decoupled’ from that of
its constituent individuals, so the group becomes the new Darwinian
individual. One way this can occur is through reproductive division-
of-labour, i.e. germ/soma specialization; when complete, such spe-
cialization means that lower-level individuals cease to be autonomous
evolutionary units. Another is through the evolution of policing mech-
anisms to suppress within-group conflict (cf. Clarke ([2013])).
Michod does not explicitly relate his theory to the KS versus MLS
issue, but it is natural to suggest a link. In the early transitional
stages, prior to fitness decoupling, individuals engage in social inter-
actions; at this stage individual fitness is primary and group fitness
derivative, so KS will be causally adequate. Once fitness decoupling
has occurred, group fitness becomes primary, and the MLS approach
becomes causally adequate. If this is correct, then Michod’s notion
of ‘fitness decoupling’ offers a way of fleshing out the abstract graph-
ical approach developed above, as it provides a criterion for helping
decide which causal graph applies to which empirical cases. Prior to
fitness decoupling, the relevant causal structure will look something
like Figure 6, while after fitness decoupling it will look like Figure 8
or 9. Note, however, that this connection with Michod’s work is a
plausible conjecture, not something that has been formally shown.
7 Conclusion
The opposition between the kin and multi-level selection approaches
to social evolution has long polarized evolutionary biologists. In re-
cent discussions theorists have increasingly come to regard the two
approaches as equivalent, on the grounds that a correct expression
for allele frequency change in structured populations can be written
using either approach. However this establishes only that KS and
MLS are predictively equivalent, not that they constitute equally ad-
equate causal descriptions of the evolutionary process. The bulk of
this paper has been concerned with fleshing out, in a precise way, the
meaning of ‘causal adequacy’, and using it to determine when the KS
and MLS decompositions of the total evolutionary change count as
29See (Michod [2005], [2006], [2007]); Michod and Roze [1999]; Michod et al. [2006]).
For discussion of Michod’s notion of ‘fitness decoupling’, see Okasha ([2006]), [2009]) and
Bossert, Qi and Weymark ([2013]).
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causally adequate.
The theory presented here does not pretend to be complete. Even
if the theory is broadly on the right lines, a number of important
issues remain. One is to get clearer about the implicit metaphysical
commitments involved in the multi-level causal graphs above, which
contain both individual and group variables. Another is to address
the epistemological problem of how we can tell which causal graph
is correct, in any given case. Finally, further work to map actual
empirical cases onto the abstract framework developed here would be
useful; the cases discussed in the evolutionary transitions literature
are an obvious starting point. These all represent potential avenues
for future work.
Finally, the need for the above theory stems from a striking disjunc-
tion between the scientific explanations that evolutionary biologists
aim to give, which are causal, and the formal models of the evolution-
ary process that they develop, in which causal concepts do not feature
explicitly. This disjunction is not unique to evolutionary biology, less
still to social evolution theory, but is a quite general problem; it stems
from the fact that a mathematical framework adequate for describing
causal relations has only been developed fairly recently (Pearl [2000];
Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines [2001]). Importing this framework into
biology, and philosophy of biology, is an important task for the future;
pioneering first steps were taken by Shipley ([2000]), but much remains
to be done.
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